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SATISFYING MISSOURI'S PERPETUITY RULES*
MERLE E. BRAKEt
INTRODUCTION
Satisfying the so-called perpecuity rules enjoys the undeserved
reputation of being one of the most troublesome problems en-
countered in designing transfers of property. Although the learn-
ing about such rules may seem intricate and confusing, this is due,
not to any complexities inherent in the rules themselves, but
rather to the construction problems so often associated with
the application of such rules, and to the confusion necessarily
incident to the explorations of the courts as they seek to deter-
mine the objectives, the operational areas, and the permissible
period of such rules. From the standpoint of the draftsman of a
deed or a will, the perpetuity rules seldom present serious diffi-
culties once they are clearly defined in the law. Usually a con-
veyor's scheme for the disposition of his property is safely within
the confines of the perpetuity rules. Sometimes his plans are so
ambitious that they overstep these bounds, and must be changed
accordingly.
That same compelling urge to curtail future transfers of the
property which they have conveyed that has characterized En-
glish landowners throughout the centuries is manifest on the
part of many conveyors in the United States, despite the absence
of the same impelling inducement, land scarcity. Diminishing
litigation in this field of the law does not necessarily imply any
lessening of these desires; more probably it indicates a compre-
hension on the part of landowners that the hostile attitude of
the courts towards these restraints has become crystallized in
the law. Such restraints may be desired by conveyors in order to
continue the ownership of the conveyed property in the con-
veyor's family, either for sentimental reasons or to enhance the
financial prestige of his descendants; to assure more adequate
support and maintenance of the conveyor, the conveyee, or others;
to prevent the acquisition of the property by one disliked by the
* This discussion is limited to the rule against restraints on alienation
and the common law rule against perpetuities.
t Professor of Law, University of Detroit.
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conveyor; to preserve the homogeneity of the group residing in
a particular area; to prevent the loss of the property for the
satisfaction of the con-'eyee's debts; and for other similar pur-
poses. Where a conveyor's plans for the disposition of his prop-
erty do not conform to the requirements of social policy with
respect to restraints upon alienation, they must, of course, be
changed. However, a conveyor should always be afforded the
advantage of all of the available means at his disposal for carry-
ing out his scheme of disposition in as substantial a manner as is
permissible within the limits prescribed by the law.
The Origin and Development of the Perpetuity Rules
The designing of conveyances which satisfy the perpetdity
rules, and which afford to conveyors the leeway which they de-
sire in their property dispositions, in so far as the law permits,
requires, among other things, an understanding of the objectives
of the perpetuity rules, their permissible periods, their opera-
tional areas, and the manner of their application. Since our
modern perpetuity rules are substantially identical with the
earlier rules, except in so far as new situations have caused some
changes, a thumbnail sketch of their origin and development
should prove helpful in understanding them.
While the degree of restraint which the early English law im-
posed on a landowner's right to transfer his land is more or less
lost in obscurity prior to the twelfth century, by that time the
free inter vivos transferability of land was affected by at least
two sets of causes. In the first place, an owner of land could not
transfer his land in a manner that would defeat his heirs. By
the middle of the thirteenth century, however, this restriction
had disappeared, and the term "heirs," in a conveyance to "A
and his heirs," came to be regarded as a word of limitation, de-
fining the duration of A's estate, but creating no interest in the
land in favor of A's heirs. Where land was conveyed to "A and
the heirs of his body," the courts, always alert to promote the
free alienability of land, treated this as a conveyance to A upon
condition that he have an heir of his body, and, after the birth of
such heir, A was permitted to convey a fee simple estate in the
land free from any claims of the heirs of his body. In the second
place, in order to maintain the rights and duties embodied in the
lord and tenant relation, a transfer of land by a tenant required
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the consent of his lord. Gradually, as the feudal law of property
lost its aspects of public law, this restraint disappeared. The
Statute of Quia Emptores (1296) permitted a tenant to alienate
freely without the consent of his lord.
At the same time that these liberalizing forces were making
substantial headway in freeing the alienation of real property
from the restraints which the early feudal law had imposed,
there were also certain reactionary forces busy, not only in op-
posing the removal of the earlier restrictions, but in seeking
legislative permission for the imposition of new restraints. After
the courts had decided that a conveyance to "A and the heirs of
his body" gave to A a conditional fee, which enabled him to con-
vey a fee simple absolute after the birth of an heir to his body,
the landowners, anxious to continue the ownership of their land
in their families, persuaded Parliament to pass the Statute De
Donis Conditionalibus (1285) converting such conditional fees
into fees tail, and thus greatly restricting their alienation. The
restraints imposed on the alienation of land by means of the
fee tail estates continued for about two hundred years after
the passage of the statute De Donis, and the greater part of the
land of England was rapidly becoming tied up, and removed
from commerce, by means of the fee tail estates. There was con-
stant objection to this, and the courts finally devised methods for
barring entails by means of fictitious law suits whereby an owner
of a fee tail estate was enabled to convey a fee simple estate in
the land. This was a serious blow to those landowners who wished
to continue the ownership of their lands in their descendants,
since the fee tail estate was the most effective device for this
purpose ever made available to English landowners. Following
the success of the fine and recovery in barring entails, attempts
were made by conveyors, in the creation of a fee tail estate, to
impose a condition that, upon any attempt to levy a fine or re-
covery, the estate could be forfeited. This expedient failed, since
such conditions were held by the courts to be invalid restraints
upon alienation.
When estates tail lost their effectiveness for curtailing the
alienation of land, another method soon devised by conveyors for
this purpose was to include in the conveying instrument an ex-
press provision attempting to limit, in such manner as the con-
veyor wished, the free alienability of the conveyed land. These
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provisions were, in the main, declared by the courts to be void.
Then conveyors sought to accomplish the same purpose by de-
claring in the conveyance that upon an alienation, or an attempted
alienation, contrary to the terms of the conveyance, the estate
therein conveyed might be forfeited. But again, these" methods
of restraining alienation by means of a forfeiture were declared
by the courts to be invalid. The rule applied by the courts to
meet these cases of express declarations against alienability de-
veloped into what is now generally recognized as the rule against
restraints on alienation. This rule was in its formative stages
by the fifteenth century. As time went on, this policy of the
courts in refusing to sanction express restraints against the
alienability of land was extended to certain indirect restraints
These indirect restraints include some which are such in sub-
stance but not in form, and certain indirect restraints upon
testate and intestate succession.
Besides the use of the fee tail estate and the imposition of
direct restraints, various other means, operating in an indirect
fashion to restrict alienation more or less effectively by the use
of inalienable interests in land, were devised by landowners. By
splitting up the ownership of land, by means of a use, or by means
of successive interests, or by means of a combination of these,
the alienation of such land might be greatly impeded. One of the
earliest attempts of this kind on the part of landowners was their
transferring land to one for life with remainder in fee simple to
the life tenant's heirs, with the hope that the heirs might take as
purchasers. The rule in Shelley's Case was evolved by the courts
to meet this situation. It declared that the first taker's interest
was a fee simple estate, and immediately alienable as such, thus
precluding the heirs from taking as purchasers. Other attempts
to curtail alienation by the use of contingent remainders were
met by the courts by the rule permitting the destruction of con-
tingent remainders, by the rule against double possibilities, and
by rules of construction favoring the early vesting of remainders.
These various rules proved sufficient to cope with the dangers
which had up to that time arisen from attempts to create per-
petuities by the use of inalienable property interests. However,
with the advent of the Statute of Uses (1536) and the Statute
of Wills (1540), interests in land which the law had previously
forbidden now became permissible. By means of springing and
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shifting uses, executory devises, and powers of appointment, it
became possible to settle property in such a fashion that it might
for an indefinite period of time be enjoyed by a series of limited
owners, no one of whom had complete powers of alienation.
After the courts had decided that these new property interests
did not come within the rule of destructibility applied to con-
tingent remainders, it seemed that the ambition of the land-
owners to tie up their property indefinitely was again to be
realized. Since Parliament took no action to prevent this, the
courts were put to their mettle to devise some means of frustrat-
ing these attempts. The outcome was a rule commonly known
today as the common law rule against perpetuities to distinguish
it from some present day statutory rules against perpetuities.
Having its inception as early as 1682 in the Duke of Norfolk'8
Case, its development may be traced through the English cases
until Cadell v. Palmer (1832) where the rule was finally formu-
lated substantially as it exists today.
This brief historical sketch discloses that throughout the cen-
turies there has been exhibited on the part of English land-
owners an unquenchable desire to exercise some control over the
ownership and enjoyment of their property after they had made
a transfer of it. As soon as any one method devised by them for
these purposes lost its effectiveness, either through governmental
regulation, prohibition, or otherwise, resort was had to another
means. These restraints which the English landowner sought to
impose upon the alienation of the conveyed property fell, in the
main, into one, or the other, of two general types. The direct
restraints were attempts to restrain alienation in a direct fashion
by expressly declaring in a conveyance that the property was not
to be later conveyed in a manner contrary to the declaration.
The indirect restraints were attempts to restrain alienation by
creating interests in the conveyed land which were denied aliena-
bility by the law, or which by their nature were unlikely to be
readily alienable as a practical matter.
These attempts to restrain the free alienation of land met with
strong opposition from the courts, since they were deemed inimi-
cal to the best interests of society as a whole. As England pro-
gressed from a rural to a commercial country, such restraints
became more and more objectionable. It was only gradually that
the early English courts came to appreciate fully the nature of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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their problem and the rules of law which would be needed to deal
adequately with them. Because of the changing methods em-
ployed by the landowners, and because of the manner in which
the courts maneuvered in formulating rules to thwart these plans,
we find different rules existing at different periods of time. Often
these rules had little in common except the general objective of
preventing perpetuities and rendering land more freely alienable.
Besides the methods designed for barring the fee tail estate,
and besides certain other rules which helped to prevent the crea-
tion of perpetuities, such as the rule in Shelley's Case, the rule
of destructibility, and the rule against double possibilities, the
English courts, as we have already noticed, evolved two major
rules as direct curbs upon conveyors who were attempting to
restrain alienation of conveyed property in a manner deemed
hostile to the best interests of a sound public policy. While these
two rules are often confused with each other, they are never-
theless separate and distinct rules, although it is entirely possible
to have both such rules involved in the same property disposition.'
One, the rule against restraints on alienation, is designed to deal
with direct restraints arising from the use of a disabling or a
defeasing provision in the conveying instrument, and also with
certain types of indirect restraints. The other, the common law
rule against perpetuities, is designed to cope with certain in-
direct restraints imposed by the use of property interests which
are legally, or practically, inalienable to a greater or lesser ex-
tent. The rule against restraints voids all types of restraints
which violate the rule, leaving the property free from the re-
straint. Time is no factor in this rule as it is generally applied.
The rule against perpetuities, on the other hand, declares void
all property interests which come within its operational area,
and which fail to conform to its permissible time period. It does
not prohibit the creation of inalienable property interests, but it
does require that all such interests be confined in their duration
within the time limits imposed by the rule. Thus it will be seen
that the major objective of each of these rules is the same. They
both seek to prevent the tying up of land and the taking of it out
of commerce in a manner deemed hostile to a sound public policy.
They differ in their operational areas, i. e., the situations to
which they apply; they differ in the manner in which they apply,
1. E.g., Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
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the one voiding the restraint, the other voiding the property
interest; and they differ in their time element, the one allowing
no permissible period as generally applied, the other permitting
of a permissible period which, with proper manipulation, may
serve to tie up property fof' at least a century. While in their
origin they were aimed at real property, both rules today apply
to personal property as well.
THE RULE AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
L Direct Restraints
Various explanations have been offered for the rule against
restraints on alienation. A reason sometimes given is that the
Statute of Quia Emptores, by putting an end to subinfeudation,
abolished any reversionary interest after an estate in fee simple
absolute, and that therefore the conveyor of such an estate has no
interest in the conveyed property entitling him to obstruct its
alienation in the hands of his conveyee. Another reason often
suggested for the invalidity of disabling restraints is that, in
most cases, there is no one who can take advantage of a failure
to abide by them. But the reason most often advanced for the
existence of the rule against restraints on alienation is that of
repugnancy.2 The object can not be given, and one of its most
important attributes retained. Upon close examination, all of
these reasons will be found to be specious. Ordinarily, courts
offer no explanation for the rule preferring to decide each case
upon precedent. In truth, the rule seems not to allow, nor to
call for, any reason other than that of public policyA The practi-
cal effect of such provisions, if they were upheld in their en-
tirety, would be to remove property from commerce in a manner
contrary to the best interests of society.
Direct restraints against inter vivos alienation or incumbrance
are often sought to be imposed by means of a mere prohibition
or direction, a so-called disabling restraint, to the effect that the
conveyed property shall not be aliened nor incumbered in any
manner specified.4 This type of restraint is especially objection-
2. E.g., Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo. 870, 60 S.W.2d 13 (1933) ; Kessner
v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66 (1905); McDowell v. Brown, 21 Mo. 57(1855).
3. E.g., Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) ; Kessner
v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66 (1905).
4. E.g., Clark v. Ferguson, 346 Mo. 933, 144 S.W.2d 116 (1940); Keller v.
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able because of an almost complete lack of any suitable means of
enforcement. Direct restraints against inter vivos alienation or
incumbrance are often sought to be imposed by means of a de-
feasing provision, such as a condition subsequent or an executory
limitation, whereby, upon an attempt to make a prohibited trans-
fer, the ownership of the property may be lost 5 Restraints of
this sort do embody sufficient means of legal enforcement, and a
few courts are more friendly toward them in certain situations,
but, in the main, the validity of a restraint is not determined by
the manner in which it is sought to be imposed. Direct restraints
are sometimes sought to be imposed by means of an agreement
between adjoining landowners,6 but this choice of means adds
nothing to their validity.
One type of direct restraint is a perpetual (either absolute or
unqualified) restraint upon the inter vivos alienation or in-
cumbrance of fee simple estates in real and personal property.
Attempts to impose such unqualified restraints are comparatively
rare, and the reason for refusing to recognize their validity seems
obvious. The usual purpose of such restraints is to continue the
ownership of the property in the conveyor's family.
Another type of direct restraint is that qualified as to duration.
While the validity of a restraint upon the inter vivos transfer or
incumbrance of property might well be thought to vary with
respect to the duration of the restraint, nevertheless, by the over-
whelming weight of authority, such restraints, regardless of
their duration, are declared to be void. To most courts, time is
no element in the rule against restraints. While restraints of
limited duration are declared to be void by most courts, never-
theless, it cannot be conceded that such results serve public policy
any better, if as well, than the efforts of a small minority of the
courts in holding valid those restraints whose duration is deemed
reasonable. To demarcate reasonable and unreasonable restraints
Keller, 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157 (1936); Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo.
870, 60 S.W.2d 13 (1933); Gannon v. Albright, 183 Mo. 238, 81 S.W. 1162(1904); McDowell v. Brown, 21 Mo. 57 (1885); Dougal v. Fryer, 3 Mo. 40
(1831); Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S.W. 547 (1916);
Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry., 130 Mo. App. 175, 108 S.W. 1099 (1908).
5. E.g., Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) ; Kessner
v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66 (1905); Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo.
162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
6. E.g., Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679, r'ev'd 334 U.S.
1 (1947); Swain v. Maxwell, 355 Mo. 448, 196 S.W.2d 780 (1946); Porter v.
Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 115 S.W.2d 529 (1938).
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is not an impossible, nor even an especially difficult, task, though
not one so simple as the following of an arbitrary precedent and
the declaring of all such restraints to be void. That such re-
straints are desired is demonstrated by the amount of litigation
that has arisen over them. That they may perform a useful and
meritorious service cannot be denied. A conveyor may wish to
restrain a transfer by his conveyee for a reasonable period of
time in order to protect some interest which the conveyor may
have in the property conveyed or in adjoining property, or to
assure the maintenance of the conveyee, or to protect the con-
veyee from his own improvidence. Somewhat similar restraints
are permitted through various mediums recognized in the law.
If these are not violative of public policy, then restraints in a
more direct fashion can not be so subversive of the same policy
as many are inclined to believe. A liberalization of the policy of
the law which refuses validity to restraints on alienation of
reasonable duration is worthy of consideration.
A third type of restraint is an attempt by the conveyor of
property to restrain alienation by seeking to limit the persons to
whom his conveyee may transfer. Classified with respect to per-
missible alienees, such restraints .fall conveniently into three
groups: those permitting alienation to a relatively small group
only; those allowing alienation to all but a small group; and those
which refuse alienation to a comparatively large social group.
To confine permissible alienees to a relatively small group is
substantially as objectionable as a total restraint. Permitting
alienation to all but a small group seems comparatively harmless,
but in a given case this may impose a very substantial restraint,
and the purpose which these restraints invariably attempt to
serve, that of allowing a conveyor to vent his spite, is a most
reprehensible one. Refusing alienation to a comparatively large
social group, in order to preserve the homogeneity of a given
group, is a highly controversial matter.
Any attempt to impose a perpetual and absolute restraint upon
the voluntary inter vivos transfer or incumbrance of a fee simple
estate in either real or personal property, by means of either a
disabling or a defeasing restraint, will be declared void and un-
enforcible by the coults.7 An exception is sometimes recognized
where the conveyee is a charity.8
7. Koehler v. Rowland. 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) (dicta).
8. Dickenson v. City of Anna, 310 Il1. 222, 141 N.E. 754 (1923).
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Any attempt to restrain the voluntary, inter vivos transfer or
incumbrance of a legal fee simple estate in either real or per-
sonal property for a particular number of years, 9 or until the
conveyee, or another, shall attain majority, or other designated
age,10 or during the lifetime of some designated person"1 will be
declared void and unenforceable by the courts.22 Prohibiting a
named conveyee's making an inter vivos transfer or incum-
brance of a legal fee simple estate in either real or personal
property is in effect a restraint during a lifetime and will be
declared void.23 To require the conveyee of a legal fee simple
estate in either real or personal property to secure the consent
of another before transferring or incumbering it imposes a re-
straint which, in effect, may endure for a lifetime, and while
these restraints are by no means absolute, they are not generally
permitted.2 Where a grantor retains a substantial interest in
the conveyed property, there are decisions recognizing as valid
a provision that the conveyee shall neither alien nor incumber
his interest without the conveyor's consent. 5
To permit alienation to all but a small group seems compara-
tively harmless, and courts disagree on the validity of such re-
straints. 6 To confine permissible alienees to a relatively small
9. Clark v. Ferguson, 346 Mo. 933, 144 S.W.2d 116 (1941); Kessner v.
Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66 (1905); Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry., 130
Mo. App. 175, 108 S.W. 1099 (1908).
10. Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo. 870, 60 S.W.2d 13 (1933); Gannon v.
Albright, 183 Mo. 238, 81 S.W. 1162 (1904).
11. McDowell v. Brown, 21 Mo. 57 (1850).
12. In a few states, including Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Texas and Wyoming, decisions are to be found recognizing restraints which
are reasonably limited in duration as valid.
13. Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
14. Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Ill. 362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928); Smith v.
Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411 (1939).
15. Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157 (1936). The deed in
this case provided that, if the grantee should die without children, the land
was to revert to the grantor. The deed further provided that grantee was
not to sell or dispose of the real estate without first obtaining the consent of
the grantor. The court said that this restraining clause was consistent with
the title conveyed to the grantee, and that no occasion existed to discuss
its further effect. The import of this case is not entirely clear.
A provision in a land contract that the contract shall not be assigned by
the vendee during the life of the contract has been upheld. Sloman v. Cutler,
258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932); Larson v. Johnson, 175 Minn. 502,
221 N.W. 871 (1928). Cf. Edson v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 228 N.Y. Supp.
582 (1928) (contract for sale of an automobile).
16. Provision held void: Jenne v. Jenne, 271 fI1. 526, 111 N.E. 540 (1916);
Morse v. Blood, 68 Minn. 442, 71 N.W. 682 (1897). Provision held valid:
Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E.2d 662 (1940); Overton v. Lea, 108
Tenn. 505, 68 S.W. 250 (1902).
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group is substantially as objectionable as a total restraint, and
is not permitted. 2T While restraints prohibiting transfers to
Negroes have been recognized as valid in Missouri, 18 the United
States Supreme Court has declared that their direct enforcement
by state courts is contrary to the Constitution of the United
States.23
Restricting the voluntary, inter vivos transfer or incumbrance
of legal vested remainders and reversions in fee simple is not
permitted.2 0 These estates have been freely alienable in the law
from earliest times, and the rule against restraints applies to
them in a manner similar to its application to possessory estates
in fee simple. Although legal contingent remainders and execu-
tory interests were not freely alienable inter vivos in the early
law, they are now alienable in that fashion in Missouri.
21 It
would seem that while such interests were inalienable, a provi-
sion against their transfer or incumbrance would have no par-
ticular effect. However, when they become freely alienable inter
vivos, the rule against restraints might well apply.22
Where a fee simple estate is placed in trust, the trustee's
power to alienate or incumber such property is derived from the
express or implied consent of the trustor,23 and, consequently, the
trustor may withhold his consent if he so desires. In general,
the rule against restraints on alienation applies to equitable fee
simple estates in a manner similar to the way it applies to legal
17. Johnson v. Preston, 226 111. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907) ; Bank of Pow-
hatan v. Rooney, 146 Kan. 559, 72 P.2d 993 (1937) ; Moffitt v. Williams, 116
Neb. 785, 219 N.W. 138 (1928).
18. Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 rev'd 334 U.S. 1
(1947); Swain v. Maxwell, 355 Mo. 448, 196 S.W.2d 780 (1946); Koehler v.
Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
19. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947); Hard v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1947). The United States Supreme Court has thus far forbidden only the
direct enforcement of such restrictive covenants. The Missouri Supreme
Court, in Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949), deemed
Shelley v. Kraemer not to prohibit the awarding of damages for the breach
of such a covenant. See Comment, [1950] WASH. U.L.Q. 437.
20. Graham v. Johnson, 49 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 1951); Watkins v. Minor,
214 Mich. 380, 183 N.W. 186 (1931).
21. Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo. 212, 243 S.W. 882 (1922).
22. Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 569, 185 S.W. 547 (1916). But
see Gordon v. Tate, 314 Mo. 508, 284 S.W. 497 (1926).
23. Carter v. Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629,92 S.W.2d 647 (1935).
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fee simple estates,2 ' except such differences as courts recognize
for married women 25 and spendthrift trusts.2
The general rule seems to be that the voluntary, inter vivos
transfer or incumbrance of a legal life estate may not be re-
stricted by means of a disabling restraint,27 but that it may be
restricted by means of a defeasing provision.28 While this dis-
tinction might reduce the objections of repugnancy, it does not
affect the arguments of public policy, and does not seem sound.
Equitable life estates are treated in much the same manner as
legal life estates.-' A late Missouri case" recognized as valid a
restraint against the transfer of an equitable life estate, although
whether the restraint was imposed by a disabling, or a defeasing,
provision was not made clear.
Public policy opposes any effort to restrict very closely a cred-
itor's right to subject his debtor's property to the satisfaction of
the creditor's just claims. Consequently, by the weight of author-
ity, any attempt to remove a fee simple from the reach of con?
veyee's creditors will be denied enforcement by the courts. It
does not matter whether the estate be legal or equitable, whether
it be in real or personal property, or whether the restraint be by
means of a disabling or a defeasing provision.1 In a few juris-
dictions,32 courts have recognized as valid, defeasing provisions
designed to exempt conveyed property from the conveyee's debts
when such restraints operate as defeasing provisions divesting
the debtor's title, and shifting it to another, should the property
be sought to be subjected by creditors to the satisfaction of debts
owed them. To make such an exception seems reasonable enough.
There appears to be a large element of injustice in permitting
full and complete ownership of property which is exempt from
24. Flanders v. Parker, 80 N.H. 566, 120 Atl. 558 (1923); Fisher v.
Wister, 154 Pa. 65, 25 Atl. 1009 (1893); McCreery v. Johnston, 90 W. Va.
80, 110 S.E. 464 (1922).
25. Hauser v. City of St. Louis, 170 Fed. 906 (8th Cir. 1909).
26. A few courts, including those of Illinois and Massachusetts, extend
the doctrine of spendthrift trusts to fee simple estates.
27. Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 569, 185 S.W. 547 (1916).
28. Henderson v. Harness, 176 Ill. 302, 52 N.E. 68 (1898); Hayward v.
Kinney, 84 Mich. 591, 48 N.W. 170 (1891); Barnes v. Gunter, 111 Minn.
383, 127 N.W. 398 (1910).
29. Farkas v. Farkas, 200 Ga. 886, 88 S.E.2d 924 (1946).
30. Odom v. Langston, 355 Mo. 115, 195 S.W.2d 466 (1947).
31. Kessner v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66 (1905).
32. Hinshaw v. Wright, 124 Kan. 792, 262 Pac. 601 (1928); Scott v.
Ratliff, 179 Ky. 267, 200 S.W. 462 (1918); Lynch v. Lynch, 161 S.C. 170,
159 S.E. 26 (1931).
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the debts of the owner thereof. Courts, recognizing this fact,
generally denounce attempts aimed directly at accomplishing
this purpose. However, to deprive a debtor of his property if he
fails to pay his debts greatly reduces this apparent unfairness,
partially satisfies the conveyor by saving the conveyed property
from creditors, and indirectly benefits creditors since a debtor
will be inclined to make a reasonable effort to pay his just debts
rather than lose his property.
The courts might well apply the same rule to the involuntary
transfer of legal life estates that they apply to the voluntary
alienation of such estates.3 3 Most American jurisdictions, in-
cluding Missouri, -' recognize restraints upon the voluntary and
involuntary alienation of equitable life estates if imposed by
means of a spendthrift trust, though one may not create such a
trust over his own property for his own benefit.3 A trustor may
also protect a beneficiary against the beneficiary's creditors and
against his own improvidence by giving the trustee wide dis-
cretion over the distribution of the benefits, or by blending the
interests of two or more beneficiaries in such a manner that no
one beneficiary can claim any particular interest as his own."
IL Restraints in Substance, Though Not in Form
As a practical matter any apportionment among different per-
sons of the totality of the rights, privileges, powers, and immu-
nities, which exist with reference to property and which consti-
tute ownership thereof, restrains alienation to some degree.
However, the convenience served by divided ownership clearly
outweighs any hindrance which such ownership imposes upon
alienation. Furthermore, the rule against perpetuities exists to
keep the more objectionable of such split ownerships within
reasonable durational limits.
Any diminution of an owner's enjoyment of land will effect
some degree of restraint upon its alienability as a practical mat-
ter, but again, the benefits balance the inconveniences. Prohib-
33. Hartwell v. Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co., 212 Ala. 313, 102 So. 450
(1924); Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N.Y. 41 (1856); Miller v. Miller, 127 W.Va
140, 31 S.E.2d 844 (1944).
34. Bixby v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 323 Mo. 1014, 22 S.W.2d 813
(1929); McIlvaine v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45 (1867).
35. McIlvaine v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45 (1867).
36. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRusTs & TRusTEES § 193 (1935).
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iting a particular use of conveyed land,37 or restricting it to a
particular use3s is permitted, although such a restriction may
seriously impair alienation. Building restrictions of a reasonable
nature may be imposed 9 Restricting the occupancy of land by
prohibiting members of a given race from occupying it imposes
a restraint upon alienation to the extent that it removes mem-
bers of such groups from the class of possible purchasers. Re-
straints of this character have normally been upheld in the
past,'4 0 although their direct enforcement is now denied by the
courts.
41
The terms of a conveyance may require that before conveyed
land may be sold, a designated person, usually the grantor, must
be given the first refusal. The extent of the restraint thus im-
posed upon the conveyee's freedom of alienation by such pre-
emptive provisions will vary with the amount of the refusal price,
which may or may not be set forth in the conveying instrument.
If the price to be fixed must compare favorably with the value of
the land, at the time alienation is sought, the restraint will be
slight, and might well be upheld.42 However, if the price may be
fixed at a price substantially lower than the then value of the
land, the conveyee will be loath to sell, and a substantial re-
straint may thus be imposed which should not be permitted.,
Closely allied to these preemptive provisions are those provisions
in a conveyance which require that the conveyee of the land pay
a prescribed portion of the sale price to some person designated
in the conveyance, usually the original conveyor. Such provi-
sions may prove to be a serious impediment to a transfer, espe-
cially if they are designed to operate upon all subsequent trans-
fers, and it would seem that they should not be given effect."
37. St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Fuhrmeister, 353 Mo. 232, 182 S.W.2d 273(1944); Robinson v. Cannon, 346 Mo. 1126, 145 S.W.2d 146 (1940).
38. University City v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 347 Mo. 814, 149 S.W.2d
321 (1941); Chouteau v. City of St. Louis, 331 Mo. 781, 55 S.W.2d 299(1932).
39. Stevens v. Annex Realty Co., 173 Mo. 511, 73 S.W. 505 (1903); Noel
v. Hill, 158 Mo. App. 426, 138 S.W. 364 (1911).
40. See note 18 supra.
41. See note 19 suprma
42. Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 93 So. 631 (1922); Dodd v. Rotter-
man, 330 I1. 362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928).
43. Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal 141 15 Pac. 451 (1887); Hardy v.
Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892).
44. De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1853); Dunlop v. Dunlop's Ex'rs,
144 Va. 297, 132 S.E. 351 (1926).
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A restraint upon partition does not operate as a direct re-
straint upon alienation. Each (co-tenant) may transfer his un-
divided share, or all such tenants may unite their interests, by
joining in a conveyance, thus removing the restraint. However,
a restraint upon partition may indirectly operate as a serious
handicap to alienation. If the assignee of an undivided share
has no power to compel a partition, the restraint is an obstacle
to alienation, since the great majority of prospective purchasers
desire an ownership in severalty. If the assignee be given power
to force a partition, then a restraint may be removed by a nom-
inal transfer, with a re-transfer after partition. Restraints upon
partition, reasonable in their duration, are normally declared to
be valid.45 When a restraint prohibits both a sale and a parti-
tion, there seems to be no good reason why, if reasonable in
duration, it should not be upheld insofar as partition is re-
strained.46 However, in the majority of cases, the courts seem
inclined to treat both restraints together, and declare them to be
void, although usually this exact question is not at issue.'7
III. Restraining Testate and Intestate Succession.
Where a fee simple estate in either real property or personal
property is conveyed, the law does not permit a gift over of the
identical property of the conveyee,48 since such gift over, if given
effect, would operate as a total restraint upon any inter vivos
transfer of the conveyed property, and would also prevent testate
and intestate succession. If the restraint upon the inter vivos
transfer of a fee simple estate is objectionable in the law a for-
tiori, a total restraint upon all transfer is more objectionable. In
these situations a conveyor can accomplish his purpose in a
larger degree by giving the first taker a life estate in the prop-
erty, and it is not unreasonable to conclude that this was the in-
tention in many cases where the court has declared the gift over
to be void. It may also be that the notion that a fee simple
45. Whiteley v. Babcock, 249 S.W. 930 (Mo. 1923) ; Flournoy v. Kirkman,
270 Mo. 1, 192 S.W. 462 (1917). But see Haeuseler v. Missouri Iron Co.,
110 Mo. 188, 19 S.W. 75 (1892). See Mo. REV. STAT. § 528.130 (1949).
46. Cox v. Johnson, 242 Ill. 159, 89 N.E. 697 (1909); Porter v. Tracy, 179
Iowa 1295, 162 N.W. 800 (1917).
47. Greene v. Greene, 125 N.Y. 506, 26 N.E. 739 (1891); Boudlin v.
Miller, 87 Tex. 359, 28 S.W. 940 (1894).
48. Melies v. Beatty, 313 II. 418, 145 N.E. 146 (1924) ; Williams v. Boul,
92 N.Y. Supp. 177, 101 App. Div. 593 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd, 184 N.Y. 605,
77 N.E. 1198 (1906).
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estate may be limited in its duration by a life has not been en-
tirely eradicated.
A restraint upon the inter vivos transfer of a fee simple
estate in either real or personal property is not permitted, and
such a restraint is not validated by authorizing the conveyee to
make a testamentary disposition of the property." Similarly, a
gift over of the property if the first taker fails to dispose of the
same by will is not permitted,O for such a gift over impliedly
denies to the first taker the power of inter vivos alienation and
also prevents the operation of laws of descent and distribution.
A conveyor of a fee simple estate in real or personal property
may not provide for a gift over of the property upon the first
taker's not disposing of the property during his lifetime.5 1 Al-
though such a gift over, if valid, would allow complete freedom
of inter vivos alienation, it would prevent both devisability and
descendibility. Where a gift over is made if the first taker fails
to dispose of the property by deed or will, if the gift over
were upheld, intestate succession would be denied, and such
gifts over are therefore void.5 2 The restraining of both testate
and intestate succession might seem more obnoxious than the
restraining of either alone, but the courts draw no distinction
here, and in either case the gift over is void. Consequently,
where a conveyance of real or personal property is made in fee
simple, with a gift over of what remains undisposed of by the
first taker at his death; or a gift over is made of as much prop-
erty as the first taker still has undisposed of at his death; or a
gift over is made of what remains at the death of the first taker;
or a gift over is made of the rest, residue and remainder of the
conveyed property which the first taker may have left at his
death; or a gift over is made of all the conveyed property which
belongs to, or is in the possession of, the first taker at his death,
the gift over is declared to be void.5 3 While the purposes of the
conveyor in cases of this kind will be frustrated if sought to be
accomplished in any of the above manners, nevertheless, such
objectives may be largely obtained by giving the first taker a
49. Kessner v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515, 88 S.W. 66 (1905).
50. Wilson v. Wilson, 268 Ill. 270, 109 N.E. 36 (1915); Crutchfield v.
Greer, 113 Va. 232, 74 S.E. 166 (1912).
51. Wead v. Gray, 78 Mo. 59 (1883).
52. Middleton v. Dudding, 183 S.W. 443 (Mo. 1916).
53. Vaughn v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328 (1950); Roth v.
Rauschenbusch, 173 Mo. 582, 73 S.W. 664 (1903).
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life estate with a power to consume or appoint, or both, with a
gift over of any property neither appointed nor consumed.
There is little doubt that in many of the cases cited supra it was
the conveyor's intention to give the first taker a life estate with
a power to appoint and/or consume with a gift over upon failure
to exercise the power, but such intention could not be effectuated
because it was not properly incorporated into the conveying in-
strument.
While the decisions are practically unanimous in voiding gifts
over for a failure upon the part of the first taker to make an
inter vivos transfer, it is not clear that restricting either testate
or intestate succession, or both, is so obnoxious to a properly
conceived public policy as the decisions might lead one to be-
lieve. In denying validity to such gifts over, the courts are
inclined to follow precedent, without much effort to justify their
decisions on other grounds, and the reasons they have advanced
have been successfully refuted. 54 The unsoundness of the doctrine
that a gift over in these cases is void stands out in bolder relief
in those cases in which there is not only a gift over for failure to
alienate, but an added contingency providing for a gift over if
the first taker should die without issue surviving him.-'
IV. Summary
This brief survey discloses that the Missouri cases are in-
clined to follow the majority line in a strict interpretation of
the rule against restraints on alienation. Little, if any, attempt
is made to discriminate between restraints which may fairly be
deemed reasonable and restraints which may fairly be deemed
unreasonable, on the basis of the degree to which they violate
sound public policy. In those areas of property law where direct
restraints are definitely declared to be void, any attempted use
of such restraints avails nothing. In the uncertain areas, the
use of a restraint of questionable validity may be justified in the
hope that it will be pronounced valid. Spendthrift trusts do
afford a medium for curtailing alienation, although a greatly
restricted one. A gift over after the death of a prior taker may
be accomplished by limiting the prior taker to a life estate. The
first taker's interest in the property may be increased in sub-
stance almost to a fee simple by adding proper powers.
54. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1885).55. See Wead v. Gray, 78 Mo. 59 (1883).
Washington University Open Scholarship
SATISFYING MISSOURI'S PERPETUITY RULES
THE COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
I. The Rationale of the Rule
Unless the common law rule against perpetuities belies its
name, its aim is to prevent the creation of perpetuities. But what
is a perpetuity? Considerable confusion has undoubtedly arisen
from an inability to define a perpetuity with precision. Perhaps
a completely accurate definition has never been given. However,
there appears to be a generally accepted policy in common law
jurisdictions which frowns upon the total exclusion of quantities
of property from commerce for long periods of time. Yet it has
been difficult to reach an accord as to what constitutes a viola-
tion of this policy. Naturally, any generally conceived notion
of what constitutes a perpetuity violative of public policy will
vary from time to time as property owners adopt varying tactics
for "tying up" their property. Such notion will also vary from
place to place depending upon the general character and utiliza-
tion of the property involved, and upon other factors.
In a general sense, it may be said that any rule of law designed
to further this public policy, and there are several such rules, is
a perpetutity rule. In a specific sense, the term "rule against
perpetuities" has been reserved for a particular one of these
rules. The earliest recognized use of the term "perpetuity" was
its application to unbarrable entails.56 The term was also early
applied to a perpetually inalienable property interest, i. e., "an
estate inalienable, though all mankind join in the conveyance."-I
Still later, the term "perpetuity" was applied to certain future
interests which were too remote, i. e., future executory interests
which were so created that they acorded an opportunity for tak-
ing land out of commerce for periods of time long enough to be
deemed harmful to the public interest. Thus it will be seen that
the term "perpetuity" has been employed by the English courts
and text writers, in a rather limited sense, to cover at least three
different situations, the first being of little importance today.
The English rule against perpetuities has been aimed at these
particular situations. The American courts have felt con-
strained to apply this specific rule without being very concerned
with attempting any exact definition of a perpetuity. Insofar as
56. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682); Chud-
leigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 261 (1595).
57. Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (1697).
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they have deigned to define perpetuities, they have been satisfied
to follow the definitions of the English courts and the text
writers."
Although the courts are in accord with reference to most
aspects of the common law rule against perpetuities, disagree-
ment does exist as to the exact scope and objective of the
rule. This may be attributed partially to a failure to reach any
accord as to what constitutes a perpetuity. In the beginning, the
essence of a perpetuity was inalienability. The rules, devised
by the earlier courts to thwart attempts on the part of land-
owners to project their control over their property too great a
distance in the future, all sought an increased freedom of alien-
ability. Such rules as those permitting entails to be barred, the
rule of destructibility, the rule against restraints on alienation,
the rule in Shelley's Case, and associated rules, were aimed at
combating the various devises which landowners employed for
hampering the alienation of property which they had conveyed.
The advent of the executory interests presented the courts with
new situations which the then existing rules of law did not
control. Here, then, were non-vested interests in property, in-
alienable because of their contingent nature, and, consequently,
available for the tying up process because they were unchecked
in this respect by the then existing rules of law. In devising
means to control their use, the courts were inclined to overstress
their contingent nature, rather than their inalienability. Since
both remoteness in vesting and inalienability were so closely
associated so far as executory interests were concerned, it made
little difference whether the courts emphasized one approach or
the other. However, when contingent interests become alienable
in the law, or when vested interests are employed for perpetuity
purposes, a rule thought of as one opposed to remoteness in
vesting is bound to present some inconsistencies when adapted
to these new situations.
The common law rule against perpetuities applies to both real
and personal property,59 and to both legal and equitable property
58. Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1923);
Stevens v. Annex Realty Co., 173 Mo. 511, 73 S.W. 505 (1903).
59. St. Louis Union Trust Co., v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W.2d 344(1947); St. Louis Union Trust Co., v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569
(1935); Plunner v. Brown, 315 Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926).
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interests.60 The rule is not one of construction, but a peremptory
command of the law. 1 If by any possible combination of cir-
cumstances there is a chance that it may be violated by a given
property disposition, it is deemed violated.62 It is not a prob-
ability of violation, but the possibility of violation, that renders
a property interest void under the rule. The property interest
involved must vest, if it is ever to vest at all, within the pernis-
sible period of the rule in order to be valid, but once vested it
may continue indefinitely so far as the rule is concerned.63 It is
not necessary that the vesting entail the right to immediate
possession; the rule is satisfied if the contingent interest is
certain to be converted into a vested interest, if at all, within
the rule's permissible period.-
II. The Permissible Period of the Rule
Courts are in general accord in asserting that the permissible
period of the common law rule against perpetuities is lives in
being, a period for gestation when proper, and in addition a
gross term up to twenty-one years.65 The permissible period
is measured from the effective date of the conveyance, which is
the date of delivery in the case of a deed, and of the testator's
death in the case of a will.66 An exception is made in the case of
a conveyance under a special power of appointment and, by some
authorities, a general power of appointment exercisable by will
60. See note 59 supra. See also Loud v. St Louis Union Trust Co., 298
Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1923) ; Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 235 S.W.
107 (1921); Deacon v. St Louis Union Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669, 197 S.W.
261 (1917).
61. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569
(1935).
62. St. Louis Union trust Co., v. Bassett, 337 Mo 604 85 S.W.2d 569(1935) ; Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148,249 S.W. 629 (1923);
Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907); Gates v. Seibert,
157 Mo. 254, 57 S.W. 1065 (1900); Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W.
1145 (1892).
63. St. Louis Union Trust Co., v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W.2d 344
(1947).
64. St. Louis Union Trust Co., v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569
(1935); Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669, 197 S.W. 261(1917).
65. Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 58 S.W.2d 448 (1933); Lane v.
Garrison, 293 Mo. 530, 239 S.W. 813 (1922); Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo.
464, 235 S.W. 107 (1921); Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 271 Mo.
669, 197 S.W. 261 (1917); Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 142 S.W. 283
(1911); Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907); Lockridge
v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
66. Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 235 S.W. 107 (1921).
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alone. The permissible period is, in those cases, measured from
the creation of the power rather than its execution. 7 While the
courts have fixed no arbitrary limitation on the number of
measuring lives, nevertheless, there are practical limitations
which the number of lives may not exceed.68 While the measur-
ing lives are normally the lives of beneficiaries under the prop-
erty disposition, they need not be, and the lives of any living
persons may used for this purpose." The measuring lives
must be lives of persons in existence at the effective date of the
conveyance, but this rule does not require that the beneficiaries
under the property dispositions be in existence at that time,
unless they are measuring lives. A portion of a life in being may
be treated as a life, but a portion of a life not in being must be
treated as a gross term.
III. The Rule as Applied to Future Interests.
It is generally recognized that at least one objective of the
modern common law rule against perpetuities is to prevent a
too remote vesting of certain contingent interests in real and
personal property.70 In fact, the greatest exponent of the rule,
Professor Gray, suggests that the rule against perpetuities is
more accurately described as a rule against too remote vest-
ing.71 Professor Gray has stated the rule solely with reference
to non-vested interests, as follows: "No interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest' 7 2 This statement
of the rule has been quoted with approval in many cases."7
67. St. Louis Union Trust Co., v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569
(1935); Rutherford v. Farrar, 118 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App. 1938).
68. ... the number of lives in being must not be so numerous that there
is not some reasonable way of proving the decease of the survivor of them."
Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 407, 58 S.W.2d 448, 450 (1933); Dodd
v. McGee, 354 Mo. 644, 190 S.W.2d 231 (1945).
69. Thelluson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112 (1805).
70. Mockbee v. Grooms, 300 Mo. 446, 254 S.W. 170 (1923); Schee v.
Boone, 295 Mo. 212, 243 S.W. 882 (1922); Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662,
142 S.W. 283 (1911); Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989
(1907); Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S.W. 1065 (1900); Lockridge v.
Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
71. GRAY, THE RumE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 2, 3 (3rd ed. 1915).
72. Id. at § 201.
73. St. Louis Union Trust Co., v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W.2d 344
(1947); Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 58 S.W.2d 448 (1933); Loud
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 298 3 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1923) ; Rutherford
v. Farrar, 118 S.W2d. 79 (1938).
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In its inception, the common law rule against perpetuities was
ostensibly aimed at a too remote vesting of certain contingent
future interests. However, the main objection to these non-
vested interests was their inalienability. At the early law, such
non-vested interests as executory interests and contingent re-
mainders were inalienable inter vivos by any of the ordinary
methods of conveyancing, other than the release. Their releas-
ability, however, did not render them immune to the operation of
the common law rule against perpetuities.' Recent legislation
or court decisions in many states now -render these interests
freely alienable inter vivos." It might seem that such alienable
contingent interests should be immune from the operation of the
common law rule against perpetuities,7 6 if the essence of the
rule is its opposition to perpetuities caused by inalienability.
However, the fact that these contingent interests have recently
been rendered freely alienable inter vivos has not affected the
application of the rule to them.77 This seemingly bears out the
contention that the rule is aimed at a too remote vesting of cer-
tain future interests.78
Despite the fact that such non-vested interests are legally
alienable, the dangers of a perpetuity are only partially removed
by this alienability. Alienation is deemed suspended unless it is
possible to unite all of the interests in a given piece of property
enabling an estate in fee simple indefeasible to be conveyed. But
while each interest existing with reference to a given piece of
property may be legally capable of alienation, as a practical
matter it may be largely impossible to alienate such property
because the owners of the various interests may be unable to
reach an accord for the distribution of the proceeds of the sale.
The greater the number of persons among whom ownership is
divided, the more difficult an agreement for the distribution of
the proceeds of a sale normally becomes. Although all of the
property interests in a given piece of property may be legally
alienable, the transfer of an indefeasible fee simple estate in the
74. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST P EUITEs, ch. 7 (3rd ed. 1915).
75. See note 21 supra.
76. See Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907); Stevens
v. Annex Realty Co., 173 Mo. 511, 73 S.W. 505 (1903).
77. Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669, 197 S.W. 261
(1917) ; Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 142 S.W. 283 (1911).
78. See note 70 supra.
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property may be practically impossible. Since it is so highly
probable that a postponed vesting will greatly hamper aliena-
tion, it seems desirable to make such vesting amenable to the
common law rule against perpetuities, despite the fact that
alienation has not been legally suspended.
If we approach the rule from the standpoint of the future
property interests affected thereby, since the rule was designed
in its inception for controlling the springing and shifting uses
and the springing and shifting devises, there seems to be no
question but that all executory interests in real or personal prop-
erty, legal or equitable, whether alienable inter vivos or not,
come within the rule.79 Consequently, whenever any provision is
made in a transfer of real or personal property for shifting title
to such property from one designated conveyee to another, or
from the conveyor or his heir to another, upon the happening of
some future event, such event must be so restricted in its crea-
tion that it is certain to occur, if at all, within the permissible
period of the rule.
Considerable controversy has arisen in recent times over the
question whether contingent remainders come within the pur-
view of the common law rule against perpetuities. It is argued
that the rule in its inception was designed for controlling execu-
tory interests, and that contingent remainders were recognized
in the law for two centuries before the rule against perpetuities
first appeared. It is argued further that other rules, such as the
rule of destructibility of contingent remainders and the rule
against double possibilities, were sufficient to control contingent
remainders and that there was no need to apply the common
law rule against perpetuities to them. However, since these rules
are no longer law in many states, it would seem that wherever
they no longer apply, contingent remainders should be subjected
to some other control, and the common law rule against perpetu-
ities is well adapted to this purpose. The Missouri courts seem
to have recognized the rule against double posibilities, often
known as the rule of Whitby v. Mitchell, at least by way of
79. Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208,103 S.W. 989 (1907) ; Riley v. Jaeger
189 S.W. 1168 (Mo. 1916); Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S.W. 1065(1900); Chism's Adm's v. Williams, 29 Mo. 288 (1860); Vaughn v. Guy, 17
Mo. 429 (1853).
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dicta,10 but this rule now seems to have been definitely repu-
diated.81 Regardless of whether the rule of destructibility may
still be law in Missouri, contingent remainders are held to come
within the common law rule against perpetuities.32
Vested remainders created in favor of individual remainder-
men, whether vested absolutely or vested to divest wholly, are
not within the operational area of the rule against perpetuities.2
The same is true of reversions. However, a remainder to a class,
even though vested for other purposes, is within the operational
area of the rule if it is vested to divest partially by virtue of
possible increases in membership." If there is a possibility of
increase in class membership after the permissible period of the
rule, such possible afterborn class members have an interest
akin to a shifting executory interest which may not vest in time.
Likewise, if the class remains open to decrease in membership
beyond the period of the rule, then each member has a shifting
interest in each other member's share which may not vest within
the proper time. It is generally conceded that, if the rule against
perpetuities is viulated as to one member of a class, it is violated
as to all. Consequently, in the creation of any class gift the class
must be so fixed in its creation that it can neither increase nor
decrease in membership beyond the permissible period of the
rule.
Powers of termination85 and possibilities of reverters' do not
come within the common law rule against perpetuities. These
80. Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907); Lockridge v.
Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1891).
81 Lane v. Garrison, 293 Mo. 530, 239 S.W. 813 (1922).
82. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W.2d 344
(1947); St. Louis Union Trust Co., v. Bassett, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569
(1935); Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 58 S.W.2d 448 (1933);
Mockbee v. Grooms, 300 Mo. 446, 254 S.W. 170 (1923); Loud v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1923); Schee v. Boone, 295
Mo. 212, 243 S.W. 882 (1922); Cox v. Jones, 229 Mo. 53, 129 S.W. 495
(1910); Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907); Naylor v.
Goodman, 109 Mo. 543, 19 S.W. 56 (1892) ; Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162,
18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
83. Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 532 Mo. 402, 58 S.W.2d 448 (1933) ; Schee v.
Boone, 295 Mo. 212, 243 S.W. 882 (1922) Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464,
235 S.W. 107 (1921); Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989
(1907); Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S.W. 1065 (1900).
84. Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 58 S.W.2d 448 (1933); Gates v.
Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S.W. 1065 (1900).
85. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
86. Institutions for Savings v. Roxbury Home, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E.
301 (1923); Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858).
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interests are definitely as contingent as are the executory inter-
ests and were inalienable at the common law, and would seem
to be as objectionable. No satisfactory reason is given for their
exclusion from the rule. Perhaps the answer is partially histor-
ical and partially practical. These interests existed in the law
of England for some centuries before the rule originated, and
they were never considered hostile to public policy, even though
they were uncontrolled in their duration. As a practical matter,
they are not normally used for the express purpose of tying up
property.
IV. The Rule as Applied to Trust Duration
The common law rule against perpetuities is applied by the
courts to curtail the period of time in which a non-vested future
interest in real or personal property may continue in a non-
vested character, regardless of whether or not legal alienation is
suspended thereby. It is often asserted that vested interests are
outside the scope of the common law rule against perpetuities'T
However, it is entirely possible for vested property interests, if
inalienable, and even though legally alienable, if they are ina-
lienable as a practical matter, to create undesirable situations in
the law by removing property from commerce. It is conceivable
for instance, that the ownership of a possessory fee simple
estate may be so split up among concurrent owners as to render
such estate inalienable indefinitely.8
A trust may, and often does, present a situation in which
alienation of property may be legally or practically suspended,
even though all of the property- interests involved are vested.
Of course, where equitable interests are contingent, they are as
readily amenable to the common law rule against perpetuities as
are their legal counterparts. 8' A trust may be wholly void be-
cause the equitable interests involved are contingent and too
remote. A trust may be wholly void because the equitable
87. Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 235 S.W. 107 (1921) ; Deacon v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669, 197 S.W. 261 (1917); Stewart v.
Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 142 S.W. 283 (1911).
88. See State v. McGee, 200 Iowa 329, 204 N.W. 408 (1925), where an
owner of land in order to prevent a mortgage foreclosure, conveyed such
land "to each and every member of the American Legion of Iowa,... each
and every member of the Knights of Pythias of Iowa, and each and every
attorney at law in Iowa." The court held the conveyance void, although its
reasoning was very vague.
89. See note 60 supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
SATISFYING MISSOURI'S PERPETUITY RULES
interests which are contingent and too remote are too closely
associated with the otherwise valid interests. A trust may be
partially void because some of the equitable interests involved
are contingent and too remote. Contingent property interests
created to begin after the termination of a trust must
vest, if at all, within the permissible period of the rule if they are
to be valid.
That the duration of a private trust, involving vested interests
only, is subject to some control under the law seems admitted
by all authorities. Where both the legal and equitable interests
in any given trust, though vested, are rendered inalienable for
one reason or another, such a trust, thus suspending alienation,
become obnoxious to a sound public policy if continued for too
long a time. Even though the trust res is freely alienable, so that
there is no suspension of alienation as to it, nevertheless, if a
transfer of such a trust res does not end the trust, but merely
substitutes other property in its stead, such a trust may well be
contrary to a sound public policy if it is to continue for too long
a time. Furthermore, to deprive beneficiaries who are of full
age and sound mind of the direct enjoyment of their property
for a protracted period may well be deemed objectionable.
It is well recognized in the American jurisdictions that the
duration of charitable trusts is not within the scope of the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities. 90 Consequently, charitable
trusts may be created to continue indefinitely or for any period
of time. The social advantages secured thereby are deemed to
outweigh any disadvantage arising from tying up the property,
and the large measure of control that equity courts exercise
over charitable trusts renders them socially harmless. However,
the rule as sometimes stated, to the effect that charitable trusts
do not come within the rule against perpetuities, is an under-
statement of the law and incorrect. Correctly stated, the dura-
tion of charitable trusts is not confined to the permissible period
of the rule against perpetuities. Charitable trusts to be valid
must begin within the permissible period of the rule, and a con-
tingent gift over after the ending of a charitable trust must be
certain to vest, if at all, within the permissible period of the
90. Newton v. Newton Burial Park, 826 Mo. 901, 34 S.W.2d 118 (1930);
Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 142 S.W. 283 (1911); Farmers' and Mer-
chants' Bank v. Robinson, 96 Mo. App. 385, 70 S.W. 372 (1902).
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rule.91 To this latter rule one exception is recognized. Property
may be made to shift from one charitable trust to another char-
itable trust at any time in the future9 2 on the theory that since
the duration of a charitable trust is not objectionable, it makes
no difference that this duration is shared by more than one
trust.
In England9 s and in a few American jurisdictions,9' are to
be found decisions providing a sufficient control over the dura-
tion of private trusts by permitting the beneficiaries, under
proper circumstances, to terminate such trusts and call for a
conveyance of the trust res, although the trust purposes be not
yet fulfilled. Where a trust is thus destructible, there is little
danger of its continuance for too long a time, and no rule limit-
ing its duration seems necessary. In those jurisdictions where
trusts are thus destructible, there is authority that such trusts
need not be limited in their duration. However, most American
jurisdictions, including Missouri,95 prefer to follow the Massa-
chusetts case of ClafZin v. Ckzflin," and refuse to recognize the
doctrine of the destructibility of private trusts.
Certain trusts, the so-called honorary trusts, lack beneficiaries
and, consequently, are indestructible. Included in these honorary
trusts are Phose trusts for the maintenance of cemeteries, the
saying of masses, the care of animals, and the repair of build-
ings. Such trusts, if they are deemed to be charitable trusts, are
recognized as valid despite an indefinite duration. 7 Where such
trusts are private trusts, they are invariably declared to be void
if unlimited in duration. Most American jurisdictions, including
Missouri, 9 now have statutes dealing with the application of the
perpetuity rules to cemetery trusts. Trusts for the saying of
masses are now generally upheld on the theory that they are
91. Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E.
301 (1923); Yarbrough v. 'Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925).
92. Dickenson v. City of Anna, 310 I1. 222, 141 N.E. 754 (1923).
93. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841).
94. California, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
However, in some of these states there are also cases to the contrary.
95. Evans v. Rankin, 329 Mo. 411, 44 S.W.2d 644 (1931); Owen v. Gil-
christ, 304 Mo. 330, 263 S.W. 423 (1924); Dwyer v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 286 Mo. 481, 228 S.W. 1068 (1921).
96. 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).97. See note 90.s upa.98. So. R 9. STAT. §§ 214.130, 214.020 (1949). Newton v. Newton Burial
Park, 326 Mo. 901, 34 S.W.2d 118 (1930); Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662.
142 S.W. 283 (1911).
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charitable trusts for religious purposes, whether the masses are
to be offered for the testator's soul alone, for the souls of desig-
nated persons only, or for all souls generally.99 Private trusts
for the care of animals and for the maintenance of buildings are
regularly declared void unless properly limited in their dura-
tion.' "
One reason sometimes advanced for declaring honorary pri-
vate trusts which are unlimited in their duration to be void is the
lack of a beneficiary. This reasoning seems specious when we
recognize that honorary trusts are upheld generally if they are
charitable trusts, and they are upheld as private trusts if prop-
erly limited in their duration. The courts themselves seldom
advance any reason for declaring honorary private trusts un-
limited in duration to be void, being content to rest their deci-
sions on precedent, or they merely state that such trusts tend to
create a perpetuity.
It might well be asked whether there has ever been any urgent
need for limiting the duration of honorary trusts by law. A
trust for saying masses, for example, is none the less objection-
able as a perpetuity when called a charitable trust, and yet the
courts recognize it as such a trust and surely no serious public
policy is affected thereby. The legislatures in most states see no
serious objection to cemetery trusts unlimited in duration.
Trusts for the care of certain designated animals can not
seriously offend public policy since their purpose is fulfilled upon
the death of the animal beneficiaries. This leaves only the trusts
for the care of buildings, and buildings, even with the best of
care, do pass into decay or become outmoded. Nevertheless, so
long as honorary private trusts are required to be limited in
duration to be valid, proper precaution requires that they be so
created that they will not continue beyond the permissible period
of the rule against perpetuities.
It seems reasonable to expect that private trusts which are
indestructible under the doctrine of Claftin v. Ciaflin will be
subject to some form of control in the law with respect to their
permissible duration, since they may become serious threats to a
99. Minturn v. Conception Abbey, 227 Mo. App. 1179, 61 S.W.2d 352
(1933).
100. Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R.I. 306, 21 At. 906 (1891); Smith v. Heyward,
115 S.C. 145, 105 S.E. 275 (1920).
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sound public policy by taking property out of commerce, or by
denying the direct enjoyment of the property to the beneficiaries
thereof, for a protracted period of time. However, the law is
far from settled in this respect. The cases vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, and within a jurisdiction. In two of its aspects
the law here seems clear. Private trusts created to continue
perpetually, or for an indefinite period, are invariably declared
to be void because of their duration. 01 On the other hand, pri-
vate trusts which satisfy the permissible period of the rule
against perpetuities as regards their duration have never been
declared void because of their duration.202 Many private trusts,
indestructible under the doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin, have been
upheld as valid even though their duration did not satisfy the
permissible period of the rule against perpetuities. In several
cases, such trusts have been upheld as valid even though they
were created to continue for a gross term of more than twenty-
one years.10 3 In other cases they have been upheld even though
their duration was measured by lives not in being when the trust
commenced.104 Just how long such trusts may validly continue,
the cases failed to disclose. In isolated instances, statutes clarify
the law in this respect.105 As a precautionary measure in draft-
ing private trusts, it is desirable to limit their duration to the
permissible period of the common law rule against perpetuities.
Regardless of the natural term of trust duration, a trust may be
created with an alternative duration by virtue of which it can-
not possibly continue for a period longer than the permissible
period of the rule against perpetuities, and it will be upheld.1 "
If indestructible private trusts involving only vested inter-
ests are to be subjected to some control over their duration, the
nature of such control becomes important, but unfortunately, is
101. Buchanan v. Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, 136 S.W. 415 (1911).
102. Plummer v. Browvn, 315 Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926) ; Whitely v.
Babcock, 202 S.W. 1091 (Mo. 1918); Walter v. Dickman, 274 Mo. 185, 202
S.W. 537 (1918).
103. Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 271 Mo 669, 197 S.W. 261(1917).
104. Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629(1923); Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 235 S.W. 107 (1921). But see
Mockbee v. Grooms, 300 Mo. 446, 254 S.W. 170 (1923); Bradford v. Blos-
som, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S.W. 289 (1907).
105. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 456.060, 456.070 (1949).
106. Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 145 Atl. 161 (1929); McCutcheon
v. Pullman Trust & Savings Bank, 251 Ill. 550, 96 N.E. 510 (1911).
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not clearly disclosed by the cases. There are some dicta 207 at-
tributing such control to the rule against perpetuities, but many
cases, and many leading text writers deny any application of the
rule against perpetuities to trust duration on the theory that
this rule applies only to non-vested interests. It is true that
indestructible private trusts of indefinite duration are invariably
declared to be void, the courts often advancing the reason that
such trusts tend to create perpetuities. However, in many of
these cases the rule against perpetuities will be found to be vio-
lated because the property dispositions involve contingent inter-
ests so closely associated with the vested interests that the whole
disposition failed.
It has been suggested that, although the common law rule
against perpetuities does not apply to the duration of indestruc-
tible private trusts involving vested interests only, because the
rule applies only to contingent interests, nevertheless, there does
exist a companion rule, the object of which is to prevent undue
postponement of the direct enjoyment of property. 08 Many
objections may well be raised to any resort to an additional rule
to limit the duration of private trusts. The attributes of the
common law rule against perpetuities are well known and under-
stood by the legal profession. The permissible period of the rule
has stood the test of years. The adoption of another rule to limit
the duration of private trusts would require fixing a permissible
period. That a better working permissible period can be devised
seems questionable. If the same period is to be adopted in
another rule, why a new rule? The English courts developed
the common law rule against perpetuities and molded it to suit
their needs. They had no particular need to apply it to vested
interests and trust duration because of their doctrine of destruc-
tible trusts. There seems no sufficient reason why the American
courts should not do here what they have done in other situa-
tions, i.e., mold the English rule to American needs by extend-
ing its operational area and making it more truly a rule against
perpetuities.
107. Davis v. Rossi, 326 Mo. 911, 34 S.W.2d 8 (1930).
108. 1 BoGEYT, TRUSTS & TausTm § 218 (1935).
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V. The Rule as Applied to Miscellaneous Situations
An option in gross for the purchase of property is usually held
to come within the common law rule against perpetuities.'"
Since such options partake of the nature of springing executory
interests, and since such options tend to take property out of
commerce, it seems that as both a logical and practical matter
they should come within the permissible period of the rule. With
a twenty-one year leeway such a rule does not hamper the crea-
tion of options. Where such options are personal to the optionee,
they satisfy the rule by being limited to a life in being.'1 0 Options
in a lease for the purchase of the reversion are usually treated
the same as options in gross."1 Where land is not readily sale-
able, a lease with an option of purchase may promote alienability,
though courts do not usually make this distinction. Courts dis-
agree whether options in a lease for a renewal of the lease come
within the rule, Missouri courts holding that they do not."2
Covenants that run with the land and agreements creating servi-
tudes in equity are not generally regarded as coming within the
rule against perpetuities since their general tendency is to pro-
mote alienation rather than to restrain it."1 Personal covenants
do not come within the rule.11'
VI. Summary
From the standpoint of the draftsman of a deed or will, the
common law rule against perpetuities is not difficult to satisfy.
Contingent remainders and executory interests must be so
created that they are bound to vest in interest or possession, if
at all, within the permissible period of the rule. The duration of
all private trusts should be confined to the permissible period
of the rule, unless a different period has been clearly established
109. Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 Pac. 1128 (1918); Winsor v.
Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N.E. 352 (1892); Barton v. Shaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92
Atl. 312 (1914).
110. Elliott v. Delaney, 217 Mo. 14, 116 S.W. 494 (1909).
111. Keogh v. Peck, 316 I1. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925) ; Hollander v. Cen-
tral Metal & Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Ati. 442 (1908).
112. Haeffner v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., 76 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1934);
Diffenderfer v. Board, 120 Mo. 447, 25 S.W. 542 (1894); Blackman v.
Boardman, 28 Mo. 420 (1859).
113. Pierce v. St. Louis Union Trust Co, 311 Mo. 262, 278 S.W. 398(1925) ; Noel v. Hill, 158 Mo. App. 426, 138 S.W. 364 (1911).
114. Walsh v. Sec'y of State of India, 10 H.L. Cas. 367, 11 Eng. Rep.
1068 (1863).
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by statute or court decision. Class gifts should be so created
that all increases and decreases in membership will take place,
if at all, within the permissible period of the rule. In exercising
all special powers of appointment, and all general powers exer-
cisable by will, the permissible period of the rule should be
counted from the creation of the power rather than from its
execution. All measuring lives must be lives in being; and spe-
cial care must be used when a portion of a life beyond the age
of twenty-one years is used as a life, in order to make sure that
it is a portion of a life in being when the instrument went into
effect. When a gross term greater than twenty-one years is de-
sired, an alternative period measured by lives in being must be
used.
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